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Language and Area Expertise in
Support of the Combined/Joint Commander.

by

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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ABSTRACT

This paper argues that language and area expertise in the operational commander's staff are invaluable military tools to help him understand and assess the multiple and increasing threats to US national security and world leadership. It also argues that language and area expertise enhance the commander's ability to successfully plan, conduct, and monitor the ever increasing number of complex multilateral operations that American armed forces are constantly being called upon to execute. These multilateral operations vary from combat, to operations other than war, to innumerable other operations throughout the spectrum of conflict. Language and area expertise capabilities in the military are addressed specifically in support of multilateral operations. These two capabilities are discussed within the context of the unfolding post Cold War international environment, the multiple threats emerging within this environment, and the operational conditions in which US forces may have to fight as we enter the twenty-first century.

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INTRODUCTION

Into the Twenty-First Century.

During this century, the United States has been a key participant of three momentous events which have shaped the rest of the world: World War I, World War II, and the East-West forty year long confrontation called the Cold War. For the United States, each of these events has focused on the country's role in the international order.

After World War I, Americans rejected the global role implicit in Woodrow Wilson's strategic vision of collective security.¹ Thus, America rejected a world leadership role. After World War II, the United States moved toward international leadership in response to the Soviet threat, inexorably emerging as the greatest power the world had ever seen. Every American administration since then accepted George Kennan's strategic vision of containing the Soviet Union, and a bipolar confrontation of the two superpowers determined in large measure the shape of conflicts and events around the world for the ensuing four decades. Before the century was over, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics imploded and disintegrated: the United States and its allies won the Cold War.

The international power structure is once again in a state of vast transition. This time, however, the United States finds itself as the only remaining superpower capable of exercising global leadership as a new world order is being created. In this

new environment, the United States seeks to extend the community of democratic, capitalist states, as a great number of authoritarian regimes and systems have reached their decisive point of failure. The success of this emerging order will largely depend on the leading role of the United States.

A Multilateral Approach.

Be that as it may, any strategic vision for lasting leadership in an ever increasing interdependent world must incorporate a multilateral approach that does not always place America at the hub of the global wheel. As all the elements of national power are taken into account -political, economic, military, and informational- American national security must be supported by a military strategy that understands this vision. Budgets have been reduced, the force has been downsized, and yet, the threats to world stability have multiplied. Furthermore, as the century turns over, the United States must secure and expand its economic strength and technological dominance if it is to maintain its leading role in world affairs.

Throughout this century, a number of historians point out, successful American leadership has depended more on economic strength than on military strength to a much greater degree than most realize. It is difficult to imagine, they further point out, a future America playing both the overwhelming military and foreign aid roles it played during the forty years of the Cold War.² While it is certainly difficult to argue against this

point, it is nevertheless crucial to also understand that central to our nation's economic growth in a multipolar, complex and diverse world, will be the reliability and effectiveness of our armed forces. A world shaken by violent political change and uncertainty as to the requirements of international security will not be one conducive to the stable conditions necessary for long term economic growth. The key issue facing the United States and its allies over the next decade, therefore, will be the creation and transfiguration of international security arrangements that will favor peaceful change or at a minimum contain the wider effects of violent change.³

What all this means for the operational commander is that he must succeed not only in integrating joint operations but also, and just as important, he must improve his ability to integrate his forces in combined/multilateral operations in order to successfully achieve his objectives.

A Multipolar World.

We no longer live in a bipolar world threatened by superpower global war. Paradoxically, the threats to peace are now more numerous as we march into the twenty-first century. Regional instability caused by shifting geographic perceptions, explosive demographic developments, and various crises of national values fueled by economic, ethnic, religious, and tribal activities, greatly contribute to a highly volatile international environment.⁴ In the face of this ever shifting multidimensional

and multipolar world, the foremost requirement of any military commander prior to committing his forces in any capacity is for him to thoroughly understand the nature of the conflict or situation he is dealing with. Only by doing so, can he correctly identify the enemy's operational center of gravity. This in turn, will lead the commander to develop the correct operational objectives which will ultimately achieve the overall strategic objectives.

Language and Area Expertise.

Any new approach to understanding and properly assessing a situation requires the proper tools. Language and area expertise in the operational commander's staff are invaluable military tools to help him understand and assess the multiple and increasing threats to US national security and world leadership. Language and area expertise also enhance the ability of the commander to successfully plan, conduct, and monitor the ever increasing number of complex multilateral operations that American armed forces are constantly being called upon to execute. These multilateral operations vary from combat, to operations other than war, and innumerable other operations throughout the spectrum of conflict.

ORGANIZATION

Chapter one deals with the threat our armed forces will be facing into the new century. Chapter two discusses the

environment we will be operating in while dealing with these threats. These two chapters are not dissertations of their respective subjects per se, as that is well beyond the scope of this paper: they serve specifically to support and set the stage for the ensuing third chapter, which addresses language and area expertise capabilities in the military, especially in relation to multilateral operations. Chapter III points out critical deficiencies in these capabilities. Chapter IV suggests specific steps to alleviate the situation. It also offers recommendations that the warfighting CINCs can use to incorporate and enhance language and area expertise as essential force multipliers towards their successful conduct of military operations.

CHAPTER I

The Threat.

Testifying before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence early last year, CIA Director James Woolsey described the realities of the new world order: "We have slain a large dragon, but we live now in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes."⁵ Implicit in Director Woolsey's colorful Arthurian analogy, is the perplexing rate of change in the international arena which presents a renewed challenge for the security posture of the United States. Change in and of itself, of course, does not make the international environment inherently dangerous. What does make it treacherous however, is that the very character and dimensions of the state actors themselves are undergoing radical changes. Who, for example can be confident what the basic regime characteristics of Russia, or for that matter of a number of key states, will be in even five years?⁶

Despite the rude post Cold-War awakenings in Haiti and Somalia, and the ongoing bloody conundrum in what used to be Yugoslavia, the United States is still perceived as the most capable of providing both reassurance and deterrence in regions that are undergoing vast political transformations and social disruptions. The United States will inevitably be drawn out into attempts to construct regional and global understandings and stable balances.⁷ The visibility and credibility of American

forces, as well as the appropriate restraint in their employment, may be the key to such activities.

Prior to discussing specific potential threats and challenges to the United States, it must be emphasized that most of these threats are born from a combination of preexisting Cold War anxieties, as well as from the ensuing disintegration of the Soviet empire. The following analysis summarizes the current international security environment:

It is the collapse of the Soviet Union and of its Eastern European empire that largely defines the U.S. security perspective today. The substantial alteration in a Great Power and the fragmentation of empire are in many respects as troublesome as a direct challenge from a would-be global hegemon. In other words, uncertainty as to the shape and character of the new political arrangements introduces not only a sense of hope but of dread as to both the turmoil of the transition and the nature of the world that will emerge from the chaos. If implication in a general conflict has been reduced, the danger is magnified of being swept up in a vortex of regional conflicts and civil strife, the very meaning and importance of which are problematical. At the same time, the weaponry that defined the Cold War struggle remains...As one faces new dangers, the old dangers still have remarkable potency. Even in the midst of geostrategic revolution, there is a constancy of anxieties and concerns.⁸

Change and the Causes of War

In a study published by the Army's Military Intelligence quarterly publication,⁹ the authors wrote: The struggle for wealth and power defines international security affairs... An environment for conflict grows of power shifts which produce a perceived unbalance among adversaries with conflicting vital interests. By tracking and measuring trends in various elements

of power -economic, demographic, military and psychological- the authors further point out, analysts can detect emerging power shifts among or between adversaries such as North and South Korea; Serbia and Croatia; Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia; Ukraine and Russia; and Japan and China.

Furthermore, looking more in depth into the various power shifts occurring during this last decade of the twenty century, those emerging powers with significant regional and some global influence must be closely taken into account: not necessarily as direct threats to United States national security, but as powerful nation states whose decision to wage war will greatly impact any international order established into the twenty-first century. Some of these states are: China, Russia, Japan, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Brazil, India, and a (unified) Korea.¹⁰

The Settings for Future Conflicts

In the above mentioned Army Military Intelligence study, the authors further point out where these conflicts can occur, and attempt to provide some of the answers:¹¹

- **North Korea (with possible support from China) vs. South Korea and allies:** incipient instability in the North, a power shift to the South, and regime survival.

- **Andean Ridge countries vs. narco-insurgents:** national instability, uncertain power position of governments, and regime and ethnic survival.

- **Kurds-Armenia-Turkey-Azerbaijan-Iran-Iraq:** general instability, Kurd and Armenian fear of genocide by Turkey and other rising Moslems, and prestige of Iran vs. Turkey.

- **Serbia-South Slavs-Greece possibly vs. North Slavs-Moslems including possibly Turkey:** high instability in the Balkans, power shift to Catholics and Moslems, Serbian survival, and Greek security.

- **Iran-Saudi Arabia-Iraq:** instability of Iran and Iraq; disparate measures of power -Saudi money, Iran population, and Iraqi arms; and Iraq and Saudi regime survival and prosperity.

- **Israel vs. Arab Coalition:** Israeli and Arab domestic instability, power shift away from Israel if Arabs coalesce, Israeli survival, and Arab prestige.

Each of these conflicts has the potential to spread to the great powers and conceivably engage them in larger wars involving nuclear weapons. The following examples are provided:

- Allies vs. Arabs in North Africa, Middle East, or Persian Gulf.
- Russia vs. Ukraine (and allies)¹² or Moslem Republics.
- India vs. Pakistan.
- China vs. India.
- Japan vs. Korea.
- Japan (possibly allied with Russia or Siberia) vs. China.

Language and Area Expertise.

The armed forces of the United States must continually engage in the process of understanding and correctly assessing the nature and unfolding of these likely scenarios. US forces must also be fully ready and capable of planning and executing operations in response to these threats throughout the world. In most of these operations, if not all, American forces will be combined with the forces of one or multiple allies. Whether an operation is conducted in conjunction with long term established partners, such as NATO and US/ROK, or whether ad hoc coalitions -such as in Desert Storm- are created, language and area expertise will be invaluable tools for the successful operational commander.

CHAPTER II

THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

In defining their national security, most nation states must first consider their borders and develop strategies whose primary goal is defense against invasion, or even undue influence and interference from other states. In the case of the United States, its unique geopolitical situation demands a totally different approach. As has been observed, the United States has a "weak neighbor to the north, weak neighbor to the south, fish to the east, and fish to the west."¹³ Hence, the crucial issue for the United States has not been invasion of its own land mass; rather, it has been the projection of its political influence and military power across the oceans in order to defend friendly regimes, organize defensive coalitions, and sustain US and allied forces.

Militarily, these same circumstances have favored mobile forces, military alliances, forward bases, and control of the lines of communication between the continental US and the external world.¹⁴ In other words, while other states establish security buffer zones basically by utilizing surrounding states (or the "immediate abroad", as the Russians call it), the United States extends all its instruments of national power throughout the world. Accordingly, American forward presence and force projection strategies integrate the different regions of the world, at various degrees, as an extended security buffer zone

for the United States. Isolationists certainly have a right to debate their position in a democratic society, but so far mature and responsible leadership has prevailed.

As published, the four overall objectives of US National Security Strategy are:¹⁵

- Global and regional stability which encourages peaceful change and order.
- Open, democratic and representative political systems worldwide.
- An open international trading and economic system which benefits all participants. And,
- An enduring global faith in America that it can and will lead in a collective response to the world crises.

This fourth objective further stipulates: There are limits to what we can or should do -we will have to be selective and discriminate in our global undertakings. But others have responsibilities as well. We also need to encourage the active engagement of our allies and friends. But often these collective efforts will not prove possible unless we take the lead.

THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

What this means for the operational commander is that even as the debate on the roles, missions, and structure of the armed forces continues, one inherent aspect remains constant: US forces will continue operating as a joint force in a multilateral operational environment, and not necessarily always with

traditional allies. One only need be reminded that five of our regional commanders in chief (CINC) are coalition or alliance commanders, as is one of our specified CINCs.¹⁶

Being the most powerful nation on earth, the United States will continue playing the leading role well into the twenty-first century. Yet, most observers would agree, there are severe political and economic limits to US force, both domestically and internationally. While US power may be catalytic and necessary, these observers point out, it is certainly unlikely to be self-contained and sufficient. "It is the American ability to cooperate in common or convergent forces with other states and in terms of general norms of international behavior that will both justify the existence of its military forces and animate its strategic vision."¹⁷

Already, US National Military Strategy clearly employs collective security as one of its enduring principles:

Increasingly, we expect to strengthen world response to crises through multilateral operations under the auspices of international security organizations. In the 1991 Gulf War, the United Nations played a role envisioned by its founders --orchestrating and sanctioning collective resistance to an aggressor. The new international order will be characterized by a growing consensus that force cannot be used to settle disputes and when the consensus is broken, the burden and responsibilities are shared by many nations. While support of formal alliances such as NATO will continue to be fundamental to American military strategy, the United States must be prepared to fight as part of an ad hoc coalition if we become involved in conflict where no formal security relationships exist. We must also retain the capability to operate independently, as our interests dictate.¹⁸

JOINT OPERATIONS DOCTRINE

In support of United States National Military Strategy, Joint Pub 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations" professes:

US military operations are often conducted with the armed forces of other nations in pursuit of common objectives. Such operations have been the cornerstone of the US military since the nation's infancy. From the Revolutionary War to the present, United States armed forces have often fought to defend US national interests as part of a larger multinational force... Each partner in multinational operations possesses a unique cultural identity --the result of language, values, religious systems, and economic and social outlooks. Even seemingly minor differences, such as dietary restrictions, can have great impact.

It then goes on to underscore: Language differences often present the most immediate challenge. Specifying an official coalition language can be a sensitive issue. US forces cannot assume that the predominant language will automatically be English. Information loss during translation can be high, and misunderstandings and miscommunications can have disastrous effects.¹⁹

PRINCIPLES OF WAR: INTEGRATION

In establishing a joint/combined command at the operational level, the first consideration to take into account is how to effectively integrate the various elements into an effective, unified force. As US Army General W. Riscassi, COMUSFOR KOREA repeatedly points out, in coalition warfare the patchwork approach of assigning each nation a piece of real estate simply does not work.²⁰ Somalia is but one recent example, where local warlords successfully tore at the seams of the coalition by

effectively attacking individual country forces, who in turn did not always respond in accordance with the overall coalition strategy or rules of engagement. This lack of unity became apparent not only on the field against ragtag groups of fighters, but also among the various operational commanders, as well as to embarrassingly high levels of command in the various capitals of the countries represented in the coalition in Somalia.

The ability to integrate, thus, rests largely on one principle. Unity of command is the most fundamental principle of warfare, the single most difficult principle to gain in combined warfare.²¹ If political frictions inhibit proper assignment of authority, GEN Riscassi argues, responsibilities and operational design must then be altered to ensure unity of command:

Theater headquarters -the theater command and each of the component commands- should be both joint and combined in configuration and manning. Regardless of the nationality of the commander, the staff must represent the cross section of units under command. This practice of combining staffs must be followed to whatever depth of echelon that units are combined in formation. At the theater level, it may be essential to form combined joint targeting boards to manage the integrated targeting process for deep operations... The same form of tool may be necessary at each cascading level where joint and combined capabilities must be merged.²²

While he commanded the US Sixth Fleet, Admiral William Owens, currently Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote:

We have found that extensive, regular operations seminars and table-top gaming among the military representatives of all Services and from different nations build the kind of interservice and international dialogues that are the foundation for efficient joint and combined operations. And they are a logical first step in the desired transition from

commitment to reality; that is, turning the logic of joint and combined military operations into exercises and ultimately into regular operations.²³

As he was leaving his command, ADM Owens listed a series of bilateral and multilateral interactions in which the Sixth Fleet was engaged in a one year period: multinational military exercises, political-military dialogue, staff-to-staff discussions with allies, seminar wargaming, operations scheduling conferences, freedom of navigation operations, drug trafficking surveillance, antiterrorism operations, port visits, humanitarian aid, base access, and intelligence exchanges. This list is but a representative sample of what our operational commanders must deal with: all in a day's work.

A NEW PARADIGM

Just as the different services finally came to terms in understanding the nature of joint warfare, eventually some of the armed forces of the most powerful nations, -including those of the United States- will step above the paradigms of their own national doctrines and structures and look for more effective ways to integrate and combine their efforts. Language is one of the multiple inhibitors to effective coalition warfare. The next chapter will point out, however, that language capabilities and area expertise in the armed forces of the United States will actually provide invaluable tools for the operational commander in effectively dealing with this new, yet historical, paradigm.

CHAPTER III

Lessons Learned

US armed forces are wasting linguist talent and area expertise. Far too many linguists are either not being utilized, or worse, they are leaving the service out of frustration. Because we are wasting this talent, operational commanders will continue lacking crucial translation and interpreter support when conducting operations in the future. Past wars and recent campaigns in Panama, the Persian Gulf, and even more recently in Haiti/Guantanamo and Somalia prove this true.²⁴

During World War I, American servicemen of French, German, and Italian descent provided American commanders crucial translation of enemy prisoners, allied counterparts, and even of the civilian population. The lack of sufficient American linguists in Viet Nam, on the other hand, made field commanders dependent upon unreliable native translators who were often either enemy agents or were susceptible to enemy threats.²⁵ Although there were a number of English speaking South Vietnamese counterparts at the operational level, coordination and unity of effort were not always satisfactory. Much is lost when only one language, and thus one culture, is understood by members of a coalition.

Turning to recent examples, the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS) noted a "Shortage of Spanish Linguists" for Operation Just Cause in Panama, "Shortage of Arabic

Linguists" for Operation Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf, "Shortage of French and Creole Linguists" for Operation Git'mo in Haiti, and "Shortage of Italian and Somali Linguists" for Operations Provide Relief and Restore Hope in Somalia.²⁶

Certainly, a "shortage of linguists" can also be expected for future operations. It doesn't have to be this way. Let's discuss some of the causes for our apparent inability to resolve this problem in spite of having to relearn the same lesson each time.

The Military Linguist Community

There are approximately 16,500 language billets among all the uniformed services. Most of the officially recognized linguists, however, are enlisted. Commissioned and warrant officers constitute only about 18% of the total linguist community.²⁷ Two other interesting facts to note are that over 80% of all military linguists serve in an intelligence or cryptology career field, with about 60% of all language requirements found within the US Army.²⁸

Approximately 90% of all linguists receive their initial training at the Defense Language Institute, Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) in Monterrey, California. Nearly 4,500 service members graduate each year. DLIFLC provides excellent and very demanding instruction, and most of the instructors are native speakers. The operational commander must realize, however, that graduates are not fluent nor are they necessarily experts on any

particular area of the world. Therefore, once personnel have received this initial, and very expensive training, the commander would benefit immensely if he were to provide continued opportunities for his linguists to enhance their knowledge and practice of their respective language and area expertise.²⁹

Operational Use of Linguists

For the operational commander, the key to successfully utilizing linguists lies in his understanding that these professionals can provide much more than expedient translation. A fully qualified linguist will not only be aware of the operational requirements, he will also be able to convey the full cultural dimension of what he is interpreting. This is true not only for the intelligence specialist who is collecting, analyzing and disseminating fused intelligence but also for the staff officer who is planning and coordinating operations with coalition partners.

Practical, mission enhancement usage of a foreign language by an operational commander's staff is unlimited. During deployments, exercises, and actual operations, a number of items are candidates for quick, accurate, and reliable translation: memos, trip reports, briefing slides, letters, MOUs, contracts, directives, after-action reports, host-nation identification cards, manuals, and other publications.

Language capabilities in the operational commander's staff also allow him and his allied counterparts to communicate more

easily by corresponding in each other's language. Intelligence exchange can be conducted in the allied language. The data would be more meaningful as well as more timely. The operations staff can provide host-nation counterparts with complete joint operations orders already translated into their language, thus enhancing combat effectiveness and reducing the margin for error or misunderstanding. Language capabilities and foreign area expertise also provide essential support to time-sensitive PSYOP leaflets, posters, newspapers, and radio and television broadcasting destined for the enemy or a foreign audience.³⁰ This is only a partial list of requirements that language capabilities can support. As Command and Control Warfare (C2W) is further developed, language capability must be an integral element of this warfare concept.

A valid counterpoint to the use of languages other than English is that in a number of instances, allies prefer to use it as the common alliance language. English is not only the most widespread used language in professional circles but it also provides a neutral means of communicating. Such is the case with both Israelis and Arabs, for example.

Nevertheless, at the very minimum even if coalition partners speak English, the fact that the American commander has staff members who speak a language other than English, goes a long way to dispel the global myth of American arrogance.³¹ Dispelling this myth certainly enhances our image of leadership. Therefore, whether the linguist is part of the combined commander's

intelligence or operational teams, he will be indispensable in providing a true understanding of the situation from a coalition point of view. Linguists can provide the commander a much needed lubricant to make the coalition machine work better towards the achievement of common objectives.

The worst problem facing qualified linguists is the lack of opportunities to maintain their fluency. As US forces continue to be draw down from overseas, this problem will only worsen. An enlightened commander will provide opportunities to his linguists in a sustained and systematic way. This will not only enhance the retention and morale of qualified personnel, it will also provide direct benefits to the command's overall accomplishment of the mission. The commander can do this in several ways, some of which will be discussed in the next chapter.

Linguists and The Services

The Army is the most proactive of the services in designing and maintaining sustained language training for their personnel. The Army's intelligence community, specifically, tries to provide as many opportunities as possible to offer language training to interested soldiers. One outstanding example is the 201st MI Brigade at Fort Lewis, Washington. The 201st has a full time Brigade Language Officer. The Brigade not only contracts for language training at a nearby college, it also offers intensive, seven hours per day language training at various levels of expertise at its Fort Lewis Training Facility.³² The 201st is

also very aggressive in finding opportunities for their graduates to apply their training. Brigade personnel are very proud of the fact that they have provided qualified linguists not only to the various armed services at various times, but also to the Coast Guard, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Foreign Science and Technology Center.

Unfortunately, such is not the case throughout the Army, or any of the other services for that matter. Innumerable professional service articles and official reports continue to highlight and stress the need for sustained service and command commitment to language and area expertise training. Lamentably, Foreign Area Officers (FAO) are often considered outside the mainstream by those who clearly do not appreciate nor understand their contribution to the overall effort. This attitude, of course, lessens promotion opportunities for FAO's.

Another way of increasing linguist capabilities, of course, is for all the services to consider expanding their recruiting to qualified graduates in languages and foreign studies. The national intelligence agencies have been doing it for years. Language and foreign studies graduates should most definitely not be limited to intelligence and cryptology career fields. Any commander who has been involved in multilateral exercises or operations has surely wished, at one time or another, that he had better language capabilities throughout his staff. As discussed in previous chapters, language is not just a nice to have

expertise. It sometimes becomes a key capability directly in support of command and control, and overall unity of effort. In an area of downsizing, unfortunately, none of the services are giving language capabilities any recruiting priority.

In the aggregate, too much money and language talent is being wasted in our military. Frustrated and discouraged by lack of sustained command support, linguists leave the service in relatively record numbers compared to other fields of expertise. The major flaws in the system center around the maintenance of language skills. Too often, there are few opportunities for linguists to maintain their proficiency. With overseas bases closing down every year, opportunities will diminish even further. US military exercises and operations, however, reach around the world. With the support of the services, operational commanders can prevent this loss of opportunity and expensive talent. The next chapter offers some recommendations the CINCs can implement in support of sustained command language training.

CHAPTER IV

Conclusion and Recommendations

In an era of increased multilateral operations for US forces, language capabilities in the operational commander's staff are inextricably linked to mission accomplishment. Warfighting CINCs are in an ideal position to utilize linguists in a broader range of activities. With the support of the various services, CINCs can also provide continuous and wider opportunities for training, maintenance of proficiency, and promotability. If more linguists are retained on active duty, a cadre of experienced professionals can provide increased quality support to the intelligence and operational efforts of the warfighter. The following recommendations are made to improve the commander's utilization of language capabilities.

- First, know your linguistic assets. A comprehensive, updated, command-wide data base must be maintained. The services maintain a data base of individuals who have taken the Defense Language Proficiency Test. The Command's language manager can tap into these databases. Native speakers and individuals who have served in attache, security assistance, or in any other capacity with exposure to a foreign language, should be included and categorized in the command's data base. All augmenting units during a crisis or contingency should include a list of qualified linguists as part of their operational orders. During the Gulf War, the Marine Amphibious Force had excellent linguist

capabilities, but they were never utilized by the CINC. Yet, as mentioned earlier, JULLS lists a serious shortage of Arab linguists for Desert Storm.

- Second, once linguists are identified, they should be given every opportunity to maintain and enhance proficiency. The Army's 201st MI Brigade language training program is an example to emulate. At their level, the CINCs can provide even better opportunities. The different countries in the CINC's AOR provide an ideal training ground. Staff officers can be augmented to the various US embassies included in the command's AOR.

SOUTHCOM is already doing this. USCINCSO has teams of two officers in twelve of the region's countries. Called Tactical Analysis Teams (TAT), these officers augment and support the Ambassadors' counter drug programs. Rotating every six months, these officers return to the command with an invaluable wealth of language, culture, and intelligence exposure and experience. Of course, the interagency, joint, and combined experience they gain is invaluable. Five of our unified CINCs can do this. Encouraged by the TATs' success, USACOM has begun to augment officers in support of SOUTHCOM's efforts. Regardless of the mission, officers can augment either the Embassy or the SAO/MILGRP Commander. The structure is already in place, and the only cost to the CINC are TAD funds, a small investment with a very profitable return.

The CINC can also support a command training program. This can be done more effectively by a combination of establishing an

actual training curriculum with civilian and military instructors at the command, and by contracting with a local college. The intelligence and personnel directors can manage this program. The services already pay for 75% of a member's college tuition. The CINC can help towards covering the other 25%. Again, this is a relatively small investment for a very profitable return in expertise, morale, and retention.

- Third, DoD should seek an increase both in language pay and opportunities to earn it, by expanding the number of billets qualified to earn language pay, especially for officers. The services, of course, must support all these initiatives. If linguists and foreign area experts are, by definition, considered by their services to be "outside the mainstream," then they will be at a disadvantage before promotion boards. Therefore, few quality people will either want to join, or remain in the ranks.

- The fourth, and perhaps the key recommendation, is for all the services to upgrade language and area expertise into a subspecialty for qualified officers.³³ There are already a few programs where this idea is being successfully implemented. One is managed by the Navy's intelligence community. Selected officers are given the opportunity to acquire a subspecialty in Russian affairs.³⁴ These officers are provided with extensive language training, followed by intermittent tours in Russia or Eastern Europe throughout their career. In effect, what this does, is provide these experts with an officially supported career path, where proficiency in both the officer's designator

and subspecialty are managed and maintained. The same should be done for various other regions, particularly the Middle East, Latin America, and East Asia. Earlier attempts to do this have failed, mostly because the expertise was focused either as a designator, or merely as an identifiable ability for detailing purposes, rather than as a subspecialty, as is recommended here.³⁵

In summary, the foregoing views argue that the operational commander can benefit both by identifying and better utilizing his linguists, as well as by providing them with better opportunities for sustained training. For the solution to be permanent and far reaching, however, the services must also support these efforts by incorporating language and area expertise as a managed subspecialty in selected officers' career paths. In a complex, multipolar world, where multilateral operations are the order of the day and communications are fast developing into a form of warfare, language capabilities are unquestionably an invaluable tool for the operational commander.

NOTES

1. David Jablonsky, Paradigm Lost? Transitions and the Search for a New World Order, (U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, July 1993), p. v.
2. John Wood, America the Vincible, (Prentice Hall, 1989), p. 112.
3. Ibid, p. 208.
4. Alan R. Goldman, "Threat to the New World Order", (Military Intelligence, January-March 93), p. 43.
5. Lance Morrow, "To Conquer the Past", (TIME Magazine, Jan 3, 1994), p. 34.
6. Wood, p. 201.
7. Ibid, p. 203.
8. Ibid, p.190.
9. Goldman, p. 44.
10. Ibid, p. 44.
11. Ibid, p.45.
12. During President Clinton's recent trip to Europe and Russia, Ukraine announced it would give up or destroy its entire nuclear arsenal. Once verified, a nuclear free Ukraine will contribute to lessening nuclear tensions.
13. Wood, p. 134.
14. Ibid, p. 135.
15. National Security Strategy of the United States, (Washington, 1993), p.3.
16. The Joint Staff Officers Guide, (Armed Forces Staff College, 1993), p. 2-24 to 2-36.
17. Wood, p. 203.
18. National Military Strategy of the United States, (Washington, 1992), p. 8-9.
19. U.S. Joint Pub 3-0, p. VI-1 to VI-4.

20. Robert W. Riscassi, "Principles of Coalition Warfare", (Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 1993). General Riscassi, USA, is the Commander in Chief of the United Nations and the ROK-US Combined Forces Command; the Commander of US Forces Korea; and the Commanding General, Eighth Army.

21. Ibid, p. 66.

22. Ibid, p. 67.

23. William Owens, "Mediterranean Fleet, a Testbed For Navy's Future", (Armed Forces Journal International, July 1992), p. 33.

24. Terry C. Quist, "Language Experts in the Ranks", (Military Intelligence, July-September 90), p. 19.

25. Ibid, p. 20.

26. James V. Aldrich, "Is There a Key to Successful Intelligence Efforts in the 1990's?" (Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport RI, 1992), p. 33.

27. Ibid, p.4.

28. Ibid, p. 5.

29. Ibid, p. 7.

30. Wesley A. Groesbeck, "Narrowing the Linguist Gap", (Military Intelligence, October-December 90), p.11.

31. Discussion with OPS Department advisor, RADM Chandler.

32. Robert T. McCarty, "Language: A Tough Training Challenge", (Military Intelligence October-November 90), p. 18.

33. Idea suggested by CAPT Ray Mack, OPS Department.

34. A complete career path for Russian Studies subspecialists is charted in the Spring/Summer 1991 edition of the Naval Intelligence Bulletin, p. 3.

35. As per discussion with RADM Chandler, the Navy in the 70's, while ADM Zumwalt was CNO, attempted to integrate language and area expertise under a program called CARS (Country and Regional Specialty). CARSOs were initially identified but the initiative never got implemented: the Soviet Union consumed most of the U.S. Navy's efforts. In today's multipolar world, a similar program stands a better chance - but only if it's given a subspecialty status.

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